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Involuntary Competence in United States Criminal Law 
 
Stephen J. Morse* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses whether in the United States the state has the right 
to forcibly medicate an incompetent defendant or prisoner to restore 
competence, including competence to stand trial, competence to plead guilty 
and to waive trial rights, competence to represent himself, and competence to 
be sentenced.1 Other legal systems may treat this as primarily a mental health 
law question addressed best by mental health laws, but in the United States, 
it is a criminal law question although some courts are very deferential to the 
judgment of mental health professionals. 
The chapter first presents the legal and mental health background 
concerning incompetence and the right of prisoners generally to refuse 
psychotropic medication. Although the relevant cases are important and 
deserve sustained analysis in their own right, for the purposes of this chapter, 
they are presented only as the basis for addressing the article's central 
question. The next part turns specifically to the claim that the state does 
have the right forcibly to treat, primarily to medicate with psychotropic 
substances, solely to restore various competencies. The general thesis is that 
in appropriate cases, finality in the criminal process is such an important 
value that the state should have the power to forcibly medicate an 
incompetent defendant or prisoner who refuses medication. 
 
2. Legal and Mental Health  Background 
This section of the chapter addresses various competencies, the 
permissibility of involuntary medication generally, some general 
procedural issues concerning incompetence, and concludes with 
information about the mental health and treatment issues. 
Criminal Competencies 
Other chapters explore the competence doctrines themselves, so I shall 
only provide sufficient information to motivate the main question of 
 
* Stephen J. Morse, JD., Ph.D., is Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor 
of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry and Associate Director of the Center for 
Neuroscience & Society at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. 
1 Forcible medication to restore competence to be executed is an issue in the United States, 
but since volume will be read by many people who live in countries that do not impose 
capital punishment, the editors have asked me to omit discussion of this issue to conform to 
the volume’s word limits.  I have discussed the issue in Stephen Morse, ‘Mental Disorder 
and Criminal Law’ (2011) 101 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 895. 
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involuntary treatment.  I will not explore in any depth the theoretical bases 
for these doctrines, which have been ably addressed by Bonnie, Saks, and 
Schopp.2  In the succeeding sections of the chapter, I shall assume that a 
defendant has properly been found incompetent according to the applicable 
standard in the jurisdiction and will not address the wisdom of various 
different competence tests. 
In three important cases, Dusky v. United States, Pate v. Robinson, and 
Drope v. Missouri,3 the United States Supreme Court created the 
federal constitutional doctrine governing incompetence to stand criminal 
trial. The first, a brief per curiam opinion, involved a statutory interpretation 
of the then applicable incompetence to stand trial provision of the federal 
code. The Court held that it was not sufficient to find competence simply 
because "the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some 
recollection of events." Rather, the test was 
Whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he 
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him.4 
 
Although the case did not impose this standard on the states as an 
invariant constitutional requirement, the standard it adopted for federal 
criminal cases has been very influential with legislatures and courts that 
have addressed the Issue. The current federal standard is similar. A 
defendant will be found mentally incompetent to stand trial if the defendant, 
 
is presently [sic] suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him 
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the 
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist 
properly in his defense  
 
 
2 Richard J. Bonnie, ‘The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical 
Reformulation’ (1992) 10 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 291; Richard J. Bonnie, ‘The 
Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope’ (1993) 47 University of 
Miami Law Review 539; Elyn R. Saks, Refusing Care: Treatment and the Rights of the 
Mentally Ill (University of Chicago 2002); Robert F. Schopp, ‘Involuntary Treatment and 
Competence to Proceed in the Criminal Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases’ (2006) 24 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 495.  
3 Dusky v United States 36 US 402 (1960); Pate v Robinson 383 US 375 (1966); Drope v 
Missouri 420 US 162 (1974).   
4 Dusky v United States 36 US 402, 402.   
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Pate held that the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defen-
dant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent violated 
the due process right to a fair trial, thus cementing the constitutional status 
of the prohibition against trying an incompetent defendant. The Court 
also observed that it was contradictory to claim that an incompetent 
defendant could waive the right to have his competence determined. 
Drope noted that the prohibition against trying incompetent defendants 
is fundamental to an adversary process. The Court held that due process 
requires that, at any time during criminal proceedings that a defendant's 
competence seems to be in question, further inquiry is required. The 
Court wrote that "There are ... no fixed or immutable signs which 
invariably indicate the need for further inquiry ... ",5 and that deciding to 
do so was often a difficult inquiry, calling for the exercise of judgment. 
The rationale for the constitutional doctrine, which is rooted in the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, appears straightforward: A 
defendant cannot receive a fair trial if he or she is incompetent. After all, if 
a defendant does not understand what is happening or cannot assist counsel, 
the defendant's ability to help guide his or her own defense will be 
substantially impaired because the defendant will not be able rationally to 
make crucial decisions, such as whether to testify in his own defense or to 
raise various claims, and he will not be able to assist counsel to defeat the 
prosecution's case. Accuracy and autonomy interests are therefore 
compromised. Moreover, it undermines the dignity of the criminal trial 
process to try an incompetent defendant. Although these are undoubtedly 
weighty concerns, there is reason to believe that the defendant's competence 
may not be as practically important to achieving a fair trial as the Court 
implicitly assumed.6 Nevertheless, the constitutional prohibition against 
trying incompetent defendants is now clear and settled. As Justice 
Blackmun wrote, "It is axiomatic by now that criminal prosecution of 
an incompetent defendant offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment".7  
In Godinez, the Court considered whether the standard for competence to 
plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel should differ from the standard for 
competence to stand trial. Pleading guilty waives all of a defendant's 
criminal justice rights, including the right to be tried and the right to remain 
silent. Although the Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants have a 
 
5 Drope v Missouri 420 US 162, 180 (1974).  
6 See, e.g., Robert A. Burt and Norval Morris, ‘A Proposal for the Abolition of the 
Incompetency Plea’ (1972) 40 Chicago Law Review 66; see also Bruce J. Winick, 
‘Incompetence to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal for 
Reform’ (1987) 39 Rutgers Law Review 243.    
7 Godinez v Moran 509 US 389 (1993).  
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constitutional right to waive counsel and to represent themselves,8 waiver of 
the right to counsel is weighty because counsel usually plays a crucial role 
in mounting an effective criminal defense. Therefore, the waiver must be 
knowing and intelligent. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that 
waiving these rights required a higher level of mental functioning than that 
needed to stand trial and it imposed a standard of "reasoned choice" among 
the available alternatives, rather than the Dusky rational understanding 
standard.9  
In a controversial decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
same standard, rational understanding, should apply, and questioning whether 
the reasoned choice test was really a higher standard. There were substantial 
arguments suggesting that a different, higher standard should be required 
for competence to plead guilty and to waive counsel,10 many of which the 
dissent addressed. Although different "skills" may in theory be necessary 
successfully to accomplish different tasks, such as assisting counsel and 
deciding whether to plead guilty, it is not clear that the allegedly higher 
standard that the Court rejected, "reasoned choice," would make much 
difference in practice. Rational understanding and reasoned choice are both 
vague formulations that provide little guidance. Whichever words are used 
to express the standard, the test should be a functional and context-
dependent rationality standard, focusing on what skills are demanded in 
a particular context. Waiver of distinct constitutional rights implicates 
distinct rational understandings of each right waived. Thus, a defendant who 
appears to have general rational understanding may appear on close 
examination to lack that understanding for a particular trial right. If the trial 
court makes a careful inquiry concerning whether a particular waiver is 
knowing and voluntary, the more general and specific inquiries should 
merge, as the Godinez dissent recognized. Once again, however, what is 
necessary is not a distinct formulation for competence to plead guilty or to 
waive the right to counsel, but a context-dependent evaluation by the trial 
court of the defendant's rational capacities necessary in each context.  
Finally, if a different or higher standard had been imposed, it is by no 
means clear that trial courts would have behaved much differently and 
appellate courts would seldom overturn a trial court's substantive 
determination that a defendant was or was not competent.  In any case, then, 
for constitutional purposes, once again the issue is settled.  Rational 
understanding and the ability to assist counsel are constitutionally sufficient 
standards for competence to stand trial, to plead guilty, and to waive one's 
 
8 Faretta v California 422 US 806 (1975).  
9 Moran v Godinez 972 F2d 263, 266 (9th Cir 1992).  
10 Richard J. Bonnie, ‘The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical 
Reformulation’ (1992) 10 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 291.  
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rights. Congress or the states are of course entitled to impose higher standards 
for any aspect of competence in criminal pre-trial and trial proceedings, but 
the Constitution requires no more. 
 Should a criminal defendant who meets the Godinez standard for waiving 
the right to counsel, which is essentially the competence to stand trial 
standard, be permitted to proceed pro se if he suffers from serious mental 
disorder?  The constitutional right to proceed pro se announced by the 
Supreme Court in Faretta v. California11 does not depend on the defendant’s 
ability to function as an able defense counsel.  As long as the defendant 
understands the consequences of representing himself, he is entitled to do so.  
Consequently, one would have thought that as long as a defendant with severe 
mental disorder understood what he was doing, he would be entitled to 
represent himself. 
Nevertheless, in Indiana v. Edwards,12 the Supreme Court held 
otherwise, in my view unpersuasively distinguishing Godinez on the grounds 
that the issue of self-representation was not raised in the previous case and 
that Godinez involved permitting a defendant to represent himself whereas 
the instant case involved a state trying to prevent the defendant from doing 
so.  Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer cautioned against trying to apply 
a unitary competence standard to address two very different questions: 
whether a represented defendant is capable of going to trial and “whether a 
defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself.”13  
Instead, Justice Breyer tried to apply a more nuanced understanding of 
competency that properly considered context.  He recognized that a defendant 
with mental disorder might be able to assist counsel but might nonetheless be 
too disabled to perform basic trial tasks at even a minimal level.  He therefore 
worried that an apparently unfair trial could result.  Discretion was left in the 
hands of trial judges to decide if a defendant is competent to represent himself 
even if he is competent to stand trial. 
 The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutional 
standard, if any, for competence to be sentenced.  This issue does not arise 
with great frequency because any offender about to be sentenced was 
competent to plead guilty or to stand trial. Nonetheless, an offender’s mental 
condition may have deteriorated between plea or trial and sentencing or there 
may be a specific problem about sentencing that is not inconsistent with plea 
or trial competence.  Criteria vary, but the essential question is whether the 
defendant is capable of understanding what is happening to him and why, and 
is able to speak for himself and to assist counsel.  Lower courts have 
essentially employed the test for competence to be executed adopted by the 
 
11 Faretta v California 422 US 806 (1975).    
12 Indiana v Edwards 554 US 164 (2008).  
13 Indiana v Edwards 554 US 164, 175 (2008).  
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Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright,14 which requires that the prisoner is 
able to understand what sentence is being imposed and why.  Some lower 
courts and commentators have also imposed or suggested further 
requirements.15  I believe it is fair to say that the necessity of sentencing 
competence is assumed for some of the same reasons that support the bar on 
trying an incompetent defendant.  It is inconsistent with both the offender’s 
dignity and autonomy and the dignity of the law to impose a punishment on 
an offender who does not understand what is happening.  Perhaps more 
important, an incompetent offender cannot adequately participate in the 
sentencing process, which may make it more difficult for the defense to argue 
for mitigation, thus reducing the fairness of the sentencing process. 
  
 Involuntary Psychotropic Medication 
 In Washington v. Harper,16 the Supreme Court considered whether the 
state may involuntarily treat a prison inmate with psychotropic medication. 
The Court held that although Harper had a substantive liberty right under the 
Due Process Clause to be free of unwanted medication, the state also had a 
legitimate interest in reducing the danger a mentally disordered, violent inmate 
poses. The Due Process Clause therefore permits involuntary treatment with 
antipsychotic medication if the inmate is a danger to himself or others and the 
treatment is medically justified in the inmate's interest. In brief, the state's 
interest sometimes outweighed the prisoner's liberty interest and antipsychotic 
medication was found to be a rational means to effectuate the State interest. 
Moreover, the Court did not require a prior finding of incompetence and 
judicial approval of the treatment using a substituted judgment standard. 
Finally, the Court found that potential alternatives to antipsychotic 
medication, such as seclusion or restraints, had not been shown to protect the 
inmate's liberty interest in freedom from medication at minimal cost to 
penological interests. 
The most important Supreme Court decision prior to Sell v. United 
States17 bearing on the state's right involuntarily to medicate a criminal 
defendant who is incompetent to stand trial is Riggins v. Nevada.18 In 
Riggins, the Supreme Court considered whether the forced administration 
of antipsychotic medication to a defendant during trial violated rights 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court re-
affirmed the Harper reasoning and holding and wrote that the Fourteenth 
 
14 Ford v Wainwright 477 US 399 (1986).  
15 John Parry and Eric Y. Drogin, Criminal Mental Health and Disability Law, Evidence 
and Testimony (American Bar Association 2009) 103-104.  
16 Washington v Harper 494 US 211 (1990). 
17 Sell v United States 539 US 166 (2003).  
18 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127 (1992).  
 
7 
 
Amendment provides "at least as much protection" to criminal defendants 
as to inmates. 
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor found that there was a 
substantial probability that Riggins' trial for murder may have been prejudiced 
by the heavy doses of medication he was forced to take during trial. 
Although the treatment was medically indicated, Nevada had provided no 
evidence that involuntary medication was "necessary to accomplish an 
essential state policy" that would justify the potential prejudice to Riggins. 
As examples of such prejudice, the Court noted the possibility of untoward 
effects on Riggins' own testimony, on his interaction with counsel, and on his 
ability to comprehend the trial proceedings. The majority thus explicitly 
recognized the possibility that antipsychotic medication might prejudice a 
criminal defendant's rights at trial. It also noted that, “... the State might have 
been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the 
drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of... guilt or 
innocence by using less intrusive means"19 [emphasis added] and that "trial 
prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential state interest".20 Thus, 
the majority strongly implied that adjudication of guilt or innocence might 
be an essential State interest that would justify involuntary medication in 
some cases, even if prejudice might result. The Court specifically declined 
to decide "whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse antipsy-
chotic medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at 
trial"21 because the issue did not arise in this case. Finally, the Court did not 
adopt any standard of review for deciding such questions. In sum, the 
majority left open the standard of review to be applied and whether 
adjudication of guilt or innocence was such an essential state interest that it 
would outweigh a competent defendant's liberty interest in refusing medication 
and his interest in avoiding prejudice at trial. 
In his concurrence in the judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote that  “... the 
medical and pharmacological data ... indicate that involuntary medication 
with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant's right to a fair 
trial.22 He expressed the opinion that the state would therefore have to make 
an "extraordinary showing"23 before it could involuntarily medicate a def-
endant for the purpose of restoring competence and he expressly doubted that 
this showing could be made in most cases considering the properties of the 
drugs then available. Justice Kennedy likened forcible medication that 
changed a defendant's behavior to the prosecution's manipulation of material 
 
19 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 135 (1992) [emphasis added].  
20 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 138 (1992).  
21 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 136 (1992).  
22 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 138 (1992).  
23 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 139 (1992).  
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evidence. He wrote that the state would need to show that there is "no 
significant risk that the medication would impair or alter in any material way 
the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to 
assist his counsel."24  
Justice Kennedy also worried that altering the defendant's demeanor might 
have an outcome-influencing, prejudicial effect on the defendant's 
constitutional rights at all stages of the proceedings, especially the right to 
testify in his own defense, and that side effects might hamper the attorney–
client relation, " ... preventing effective communication and rendering the 
defendant less able or willing to take part in his defense."25 Justice Kennedy 
closed his concurrence, however, by noting that psychopharmacological 
treatment is evolving and by recognizing that future treatments might not 
cause the behavioral alterations that concerned him. 
Procedural Issues 
The state must adopt valid procedures to determine when involuntary 
medication is appropriate and necessary to restore the defendant's 
competence and, in appropriate cases, whether medication will unduly 
prejudice the defendant. It also seems clear that appellate courts have 
jurisdiction to review non-final, trial court authorizations of involuntary 
medication. The most important questions are whether there must be a 
judicial hearing before forcibly medicating the incompetent defendant, and, 
if so, what burden of persuasion the state should meet. As a matter of 
constitutional law, deciding what procedure is due usually involves 
consideration of four factors: the individual and state interests, the value of 
the proposed procedures, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights the 
current procedures may pose.26 Given the importance of the individual right 
to liberty that will be abridged, it seems clear that some form of hearing is 
required and that the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, although 
important on the issues of the medical appropriateness and necessity of 
medication, will not be sufficient (compare Vitek v. Jones, with Youngberg v. 
Romeo).27 
In the contexts of transfer from prison to a mental hospital (Vitek),28 the 
commitment of minors (Parham v. J.R.),29 the involuntary treatment of 
mentally disordered and dangerous prisoners (Harper),30 and the right of 
civilly committed patients to refuse treatment,31 administrative hearings have 
 
24 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 141 (1992).  
25 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 144 (1992).  
26 See Matthews v Eldridge 424 US 319 (1976). 
27 Cf. Vitek v Jones 445 US 480 (1980) with Youngberg v Romeo 457 US 307 (1982).  
28 Vitek v Jones 445 US 480 (1980).  
29 Parham v JR 442 US 584 (1979).  
30 Washington v Harper 494 US 211 (1990). 
31 See, e.g., Rennie v Klein 462 F Supp 1131 (D NJ 1973). 
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been held sufficient. Although an advisor is often required, there is generally no 
right to be represented by counsel or by a truly independent advisor.32 The usual 
rationale for these holdings is that the decision being made is essentially medical 
and that requiring a full judicial hearing would be unnecessary for accurate 
determination and inefficient. 
The context of involuntary medication to restore competence is arguably 
distinguishable, however.  Although the precedents in the other contexts suggest 
that the determination has substantial medical aspects, deciding whether the 
governmental interest is sufficient to override the defendant's autonomy and 
bodily integrity and thus to medicate to restore competence is a core legal 
question. What is at issue is not simply a question of medical appropriateness 
and institutional management (and even these are ultimately legal questions). 
For examples, as Riggins33 first made clear, legal rights are in question, and, 
deciding whether medication will unduly prejudice trial rights is a purely legal 
question. Thus, there will be substantial value in permitting a genuine adversary 
process before a neutral judge, with defendant represented by counsel.  
There is little authority on the government's burden of persuasion 
concerning involuntary medication. Although the defendant's interest in 
avoiding an unfair trial is strong, it is constitutional for the state to place the 
burden of persuasion to prove incompetence to stand trial on the defendant 
(Medina v. California;34 but compare Cooper v. Oklahoma,35 holding 
unconstitutional the requirement that the defendant must prove incompetence 
by the intermediate, clear and convincing evidence, standard). This might 
suggest that the preponderance standard would be sufficient to determine 
whether the defendant might be involuntarily medicated. On the other hand, 
involuntary medication involves both the risk of an unfair trial and a basic 
intrusion on autonomy and liberty. The individual's interest in being free of 
unwanted medication is substantial, as is the risk of error and harm. Although not 
as serious as a criminal conviction, involuntary medication is a serious 
abridgement of liberty and the individual and the state should seemingly not 
have to share the risk of error equally. Thus, the intermediate, clear and 
convincing, standard has much justification in this context. 
A final procedural issue is whether trial courts should appoint a guardian ad 
 
32 The United States Supreme Court will soon decide whether a defendant in a capital 
sentencing proceeding is entitled to the provision of an independent mental health 
professional to assist him.  McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (Jan. 13, 2017).  I assume 
that the Court would find the issues of guilt and punishment distinguishable from the 
question of competence, but, as a normative matter, the issue of competence is sufficiently 
important to warrant the provision of an independent mental health professional to assist 
him. 
33 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127 (1992).  
34 Medina v California 505 US 437 (1992). 
35 Cooper v Oklahoma 517 US 348 (1996). 
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litem to represent a defendant's medical interests. If the guardian consented, the 
state could medicate. If the guardian objected, the necessity for medication 
would still have to be assessed by the trial court. Thus, it is unclear what role the 
guardian would play. Counsel is presumably capable of developing the medical 
evidence that might show that medication is not medically appropriate or not 
likely to restore the defendant's competence. 
 
Mental Health & Treatment Issues 
Whether a defendant is incompetent and whether a defendant suffers from 
mental disorder, which includes intellectual disability (formerly termed 
developmental disability and mental retardation) are distinct issues. 
Although criminal defendants might be incompetent to plead or to stand 
trial for reasons other than mental disorder,36 such as insufficient education 
or experience, many incompetence standards require the presence of a 
mental disorder as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition. Moreover, in 
practice, problems with competence are usually associated with mental 
disorder and those found incompetent are typically treated with mental 
health interventions37 or in the case of intellectual disability, with 
psychoeducational methods. Initially, research indicated that 
incompetence was especially associated with the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
and psychotic symptoms.38 More recent research, although confirming 
the strong association between incompetence and schizophrenia and 
psychotic symptoms, indicates that other disorders, too, are associated with 
incompetence.39 Nonetheless, people with schizophrenia and those suffering 
from psychotic symptoms generally are the largest group found incompetent 
to stand trial. This chapter will therefore address only the involuntary 
antipsychotic medication of incompetent defendants with psychotic 
symptoms who are being medicated solely for the purpose of restoring 
competence.  
Even after antipsychotic medication became available, the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Jackson v. Indiana,40 which prohibited indefinite 
involuntary civil confinement solely for the purpose of restoring competence 
to stand trial unless there was a reasonable chance of restoration, suggested 
 
36 Jodi Viljoen, Ronald Roesch, and Patricia Zapf, ‘An Examination of the Relationship 
between Competency to Stand Trial, Competency to Waive Interrogation Rights, and 
Psychopathology’ (2002) 26 Law and Human Behavior 481.  
37 Norman Poythress and others, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies 
(Kluwer-Plenum 2002). 
38 Robert Nicholson and Karen Kugler, ‘Competent and Incompetent Defendants: A 
Quantitative Review of Comparative Research’ (1991) 109 Psychological Bulletin 355.  
39 Norman Poythress and others, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies 
(Kluwer-Plenum 2002). 
40 Jackson v Indiana 406 US 715 (1972). 
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that large numbers of incompetent defendants could not be restored to 
competence. Nonetheless, for the last four decades, antipsychotic 
medication has provided the most efficient means to restore a psychotic 
defendant's competence, although not the only means.  
Psychotropic medication is not a panacea, however.  A substantial 
number of patients do not respond, even to the most effective agents.  All 
the drugs have side effects that can be extremely serious and unpleasant, 
and the drugs do not provide life skills that the person did not formerly 
possess.  Antipsychotic treatment has changed considerably since Riggins 
was decided. The newer, so-called atypical antipsychotic medications are 
now widely in use, and can be effective even for those patients refractory to 
the traditional drugs. Most informed professionals believe that they are the 
first-line treatment of choice for people with schizophrenia. It now appears, 
however, that they are generally not more effective than the first generation 
of antipsychotic medications and the side-effect profile is less benign than 
originally thought.41  About 40% of voluntary patients taking either 
generation of antipsychotic drugs discontinue use, primarily because of side 
effects.  Antipsychotic medication for the purpose of restoring competence 
will be administered for a relatively brief period of time, however, thus 
reducing the risk of the deleterious consequences of long-term 
treatment that some antipsychotic medications present.  
If a defendant who is a candidate for antipsychotic medication refuses to 
take it, administration requires either particularly intrusive, forcible oral 
administration or a forcible injection of agents that can be administered this 
way.   The risks of side effects will never disappear.  In appropriate pre-trial 
cases, such as if the defendant is not dangerous and poses no flight risk, 
there is no need for inpatient commitment.  Medication can be provided on 
an outpatient basis.  If the defendant does not comply with appointments, 
hospitalization can then be ordered. Even if the person responds well to 
psychotropic medication and regains reasonable cognitive control, some 
educational interventions may also be necessary to prepare the defendant 
for a criminal trial.  These, too, can be provided on an outpatient basis in 
appropriate cases. 
Despite the difficulties, medication will be the first treatment of choice 
for most defendants who are incompetent because they are out of touch with 
reality. Prescription of psychotropic medication is usually empirically-
based because there are few established links between a specific diagnostic 
 
41 Jeffrey A. Lieberman and others, ‘Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with 
Chronic Schizophrenia’ (2005) 353 New England Journal of Medicine 1209; Peter B. 
Jones, Thomas R.E. Barnes, and Linda Davies, ‘Randomized Controlled Trial of the Effect 
on Quality of Life of Second- vs First-Generation Antipsychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia’ 
(2006) 63 Archives of General Psychiatry 1079.  
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assessment and a specific drug.  The therapist typically starts with one from 
among a class of drugs that has the highest benefit–cost profile.  After a trial 
of a few months, if the patient does not respond, a different drug is tried, 
and so on.  If the patient who is incompetent as a result of psychosis has not 
responded to any drug over the course of six months, then the therapist can 
order clozapine.  Clozapine is effective with a high percentage of non-
responders but has extremely dangerous, potentially fatal side effects that 
require careful monitoring.  If the patient still fails to respond, then it is 
reasonably safe to conclude that none of the available drug therapies is 
likely to restore the person’s contact with reality.42  In virtually all cases, a 
determination can be made within six to nine months that the defendant is 
or is not treatable.  Most defendants are restored to competence within six 
months.43  Nonetheless, the potential for lengthy commitment remains and 
can be abused, but there is no need for longer commitment to restore any 
competence. A conclusion of irreversibility can be reached and further 
commitment for restoration is unjustified.  
Whether antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate and 
necessary to restore competence are essentially medical and psychological 
questions that mental health professionals can best judge. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that such questions are primarily medical or 
psychological. As long as professional judgment is adequately exercised, 
courts will and should be unwilling to override professional judgment on this 
issue. The state's interest, balanced against the defendant's substantial liberty 
interest, would not require certainty that forcible antipsychotic medication 
would restore competence. It would be sufficient if a standard of reasonable 
medical certainty were met.  Of course, the ultimate question of whether the 
defendant must be forcibly medicated is nonetheless legal.  
On the other hand, professionals and courts will need to be sensitive to the 
possibility of using less intrusive means than medication to restore competence. 
As noted, the risk/benefit ratio of antipsychotic agents is acceptable for transient 
treatment, but they must be administered highly intrusively to defendants who 
refuse to consent to treatment. In contrast, psychosocial or educational methods 
may enable the restoration of competence without medication or with less 
medication than would otherwise be required44 and such methods are almost 
 
42 Beng-Choon Ho and others, ‘Schizophrenia and other Psychotic Disorders’ in Robert E. 
Hales and Stuart C. Yudofksy (eds), Textbook of Clinical Psychiatry (4th edn, American 
Psychiatric Publishing Inc. 2003); Lauren B. Marangell, ‘Psychopharmacology and 
Electroconvulsive Therapy’ in Robert E. Hales and Stuart C. Yudofksy (eds), Textbook of 
Clinical Psychiatry (4th edn, American Psychiatric Publishing Inc. 2003).   
43 Norman Poythress and others, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies 
(Kluwer-Plenum 2002) 51.  
44  Kirk Heilbrun, Michael Radelet, and Joel Dvoskin, ‘The Debate on Treating Individuals 
 
13 
 
always less intrusive than forcible medication.45 If such methods are potentially 
useful, they should be tried first because medication must be necessary to 
justify forcible administration. Courts will evaluate whether medication is 
necessary, but it is doubtful that they will override professional judgment that 
is adequately exercised.  Sell has once again adopted this position in the context 
of trial competence, but it should be applied broadly.  
Before turning to the doctrines and arguments concerning involuntary 
competence, let us consider whether a defendant who is incompetent in some 
part of the criminal process may nonetheless be competent to make a 
treatment decision, including the refusal of psychotropic medication.  As we 
have seen, these agents can have serious side effects and there can be good 
reasons to refuse unrelated to a tactical decision concerning the criminal 
process.  Objections based on religious belief are a classic example.  In 
theory, it is possible that a defendant with mental disorder might be 
incompetent to stand trial but competent to refuse medication.  The modern 
view of competence generally is that it can be relatively domain-specific, with 
diminished competence in some areas of functioning and not in others.  On 
the other hand, Robert Schopp has argued convincingly that an incompetent 
defendant will also be incompetent to refuse treatment in virtually all cases.46 
I shall argue that in almost all contexts, the government should have the right 
to treat incompetent defendants whether or not they are competent to refuse 
treatment. 
3. Involuntary Competence 
This section begins with consideration of the general issues underlying 
whether it is permissible to medicate a defendant solely for the purpose of 
restoring competence.  Then it turns to the discrete doctrinal contexts in 
which the issue arises. 
Individual Interests 
Harper and Riggins confirm what was already clear: Involuntary 
antipsychotic medication administered for the purpose of restoring 
competence implicates important individual and state interests, both of which 
must be considered to determine whether this practice is constitutionally 
acceptable. In Harper, the Court referred to the citizen's interest in avoiding 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication as a "significant 
 
Incompetent for Execution’ (1992) 149 American Journal of Psychiatry 596; Alex Siegel 
and Amiram Elwork, ‘Treating Incompetence to Stand Trial’ (1990) 14 Law and Human 
Behavior 57.  
45 Bruce J. Winick, ‘Incompetence to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, 
and a Proposal for Reform’ (1987) 39 Rutgers Law Review 243.    
46  Robert F. Schopp, ‘Involuntary Treatment and Competence to Proceed in the Criminal 
Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases’ (2006) 24 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 495.  
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liberty interest." Whether the Court was signaling that this interest is 
fundamental, thus necessitating strict scrutiny of its abridgment in some 
contexts, is unclear, but it certainly means that this is an important interest. 
Harper nonetheless applied only rational basis review in upholding 
involuntary medication. As many courts have pointed out, however, 
Harper is distinguishable from cases involving involuntary medication to 
restore competence because Harper concerned prison administration, a 
context in which deference is granted to the needs of prison administration, 
rather than crucial, trial-related rights. 
Even if antipsychotic treatment is medically appropriate and the benefit/risk 
ratio is quite favorable, the individual's interest in refusing unwanted 
treatment is weighty because it includes the rights to dignity, bodily integrity 
and autonomy. In our political and legal system, no one has the right to 
invade another's body or to make medical decisions for another without the 
agent's consent if the agent is competent. People can refuse even the most 
sensible medical treatments for any reason they wish, including for no reason 
at all. In this instance, there may be many good reasons for refusing indicated 
antipsychotic medication, including the fear of unpleasant and sometimes 
disabling and even fatal side effects. In our political, moral and legal culture, 
it is widely believed that respect for the agent's autonomy is a deontological 
good. Thus, even apparently irrational decisions will be respected. It is also 
believed that in general agents are the best judges of their own interests.  
Medicating solely to restore competence is distinguishable from cases in which 
treatment is sought for the patient's own good or for the safety of others. The 
state is medicating so that it may proceed with the criminal justice process.  
There is thus an undoubted invasion of the defendant’s dignity, bodily integrity 
and autonomy.  The issue is whether the state’s interests justify such an 
invasion. 
Some believe and many courts have held that involuntary psychotropic 
medication also infringes upon First Amendment rights to freedom of 
thought and expression.47 Antipsychotic medication does affect cognition 
and thus thought and expression. Further, if one denies the disease concept 
of mental disorder and the status of psychotic mentation and perception as 
symptoms, a once popular but now minority view at best, then the First 
Amendment argument gains strength. Moreover, at the margins, distin-
guishing psychotic thought from idiosyncratic or unusual thought may 
sometimes be difficult. In addition, some people with psychosis may 
rationally prefer to remain psychotic because the psychotic state seems more 
desirable than more realistic recognition of their life situation.48 
 
47 Bruce J. Winick, ‘Incompetence to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, 
and a Proposal for Reform’ (1987) 39 Rutgers Law Review 243.    
48 Theodore Van Putten, Evelyn Crumpton, and Coralee Yale, ‘Drug Refusal-Schizophrenia 
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The First Amendment rationale for objecting to involuntary psychotropic 
medication has been intensely criticized despite its initial plausibility.49 
Reducing usually ego-alien psychotic symptoms of undoubted thought 
disorder that cause significant distress or dysfunction would appear to 
increase freedom of thought rather than to decrease it. Rather than producing 
"synthetic sanity," in most cases the medication returns the sufferer to a 
baseline condition of more normal functioning, much as other medicines do 
for physical diseases. Most mental health professionals understand the 
difference between disorder and mere difference, and manifestly psychotic 
thinking is seldom hard to recognize. In most cases, the "freedom" to be 
psychotic does not seem to be a freedom worth having or freedom at all. In 
the present context, defendants are refusing medication to remain 
incompetent, not to achieve the subjective benefits of remaining psychotic (or 
to avoid aversive side effects). Finally, in some cases, such as incompetence 
to stand trial, the defendant can refuse medication after competence is 
restored and the process, e.g., plea, trial, sentencing, has concluded (unless the 
state has another sufficient interest to medicate forcibly). In sum, the First 
Amendment claim seems weak in this context. 
Criminal defendants (and society) have an undeniable interest in receiving 
fair processes, including the avoidance of prejudice at trial. The primary 
rationale supporting the prohibition against trying incompetent defendants is 
that incompetence prevents them from receiving a fair trial. It would seem be 
inconsistent, however, to employ methods to permit a trial to proceed that 
would themselves unduly compromise fairness. The question, then, is 
whether involuntary antipsychotic medication would so prejudice the 
defendant's right to a fair trial that Due Process would be violated, even if the 
state has an essential interest. 
In the United States the vast majority of criminal defendants, especially in 
federal cases, do not go to trial, but plead guilty instead. Thus, although most 
discussion of prejudice has focused on trial prejudice, the issue will arise in 
relatively few cases. Moreover, we may assume that antipsychotic medication 
that restores competence to plead guilty or to waive rights will virtually never 
prejudice the hearings that consider these issues. At plea and waiver hearings, 
judges are being asked whether or not to accept a plea or waiver and not to 
adjudicate guilt. This decision is unlikely to be prejudiced by the types of 
problem that will occur at trial itself. 
As Riggins indicated, antipsychotic medication could affect many trial 
rights by interfering with the defendant's memory, ability to consult with 
 
and the Wish to be Crazy’(1976) 33 Archives of General Psychiatry 1443.  
49 E.g., Thomas Gutheil and Paul Appelbaum, ‘ ‘Mind Control,’‘Synthetic Sanity,’ 
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counsel, and the ability to testify. Altering demeanor might also interfere with 
other trial rights. First, it might undermine the persuasiveness of an insanity 
defense by making the defendant appear "normal." Some empirical research 
demonstrates that juries that believe the defendant is manifesting psychotic 
symptoms at trial are more likely to acquit by reason of insanity than jurors who 
believe the defendant is free of symptoms at trial.50 Second, altering 
demeanor might also generally prejudice the factfinder by making the 
defendant appear lacking in remorse or concern, an issue that also plays a role 
at sentencing.  
These are serious concerns, as Justice Kennedy indicated in Riggins.  Anti-
psychotic medication at proper dosage levels typically does not sedate the 
defendant or otherwise impair a person’s abilities.  Rather, if effective, it 
restores cognitive functioning and should enhance the defendant’s 
performance.  Courts must clearly assess the potential for prejudice and should 
apply any reasonable remedies, including instructions, that might reduce such 
prejudice. And many of these concerns can be alleviated by effective 
advocacy.  Lower courts have assumed that undue prejudice can be avoided in 
most cases.  
It seems clear that a defendant should not have a constitutionally protected 
right to refuse psychotropic medication solely for the purpose of avoiding 
criminal trial or otherwise to delay or impede the criminal process. Some 
defendants would understandably prefer to delay or to avoid trial for tactical 
purposes or for other reasons concerning personal comfort, and such motives 
surely cause some defendants to raise the issue of incompetence. Nonetheless, 
a defendant has no legitimate right to "game" the system by refusing a treatment 
that might restore him or her to competence, no matter who raises the issue of 
competence. Moreover, a defendant who could be restored to competence may 
in some cases, such as incompetence to stand trial, remain committed under 
Jackson, thus forcing the state to bear the expense of costly confinement. The 
state should not have to absorb such a cost unless there is strong justification for 
it. Now, there are many justifiable reasons a defendant might want to refuse 
anti-psychotic medication, such as fear of side effects, but refusing medically 
appropriate treatment solely for the purpose of delaying or avoiding a criminal 
trial does not seem justifiable. 
Standing alone, the psychotic individual's interest in bodily integrity and 
autonomy are strong, but the interest in freedom of thought seems less 
powerful. The defendant also has a substantial interest in avoiding trial 
prejudice, but little legally cognizable interest in refusing medically 
 
50 Karen E.Whittemore and James R.P. Ogloff, ‘Factors that Influence Jury Decision 
Making: Disposition Instructions and Mental State at the Time of the Trial’ (1995) 19 Law 
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appropriate treatment solely for the purpose of preventing trial or the 
continuation of the criminal process. 
State Interests 
The state interest in adjudicating guilt and innocence and achieving 
finality in the criminal process is concededly "essential" or important. In 
Riggins, for example, Justice O'Connor quotes Justice Brennan's concurrence 
in Allen v. Illinois:51 "Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is 
fundamental to scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice 
and peace."52 U.S. v. Weston,53 which presents a thorough and representative 
discussion of the state interests, concluded that it is "essential." The opinion 
pointed to the many statements by the Supreme Court that the government 
has a compelling interest in apprehending, convicting and punishing 
criminals. The state interest is not only incapacitation, but also "demonstrating 
that transgressions of society's prohibitions will be met with an appropriate 
response by punishing offenders."54 The opinion rejects civil commitment as 
a viable alternative because  
The civil commitment argument assumes that the government's essential 
penological interests lie only in incapacitating dangerous offenders. It 
ignores the retributive, deterrent, communicative, and investigative 
functions of the criminal justice system, which serve to insure that 
offenders receive their just deserts, to make clear that offenses entail 
consequences, and to discover what happened through the public 
mechanism of trial. Civil commitment addresses none of these 
interests.55 
Acquittal of the innocent is also achieved only in the criminal justice system. 
Weston concluded that trying a defendant is the only constitutionally acceptable 
means for the state to further the essential interest in adjudicating guilt and 
innocence. 
To assess the importance of this interest, consider an analogous problem.56 
Suppose that obtaining the testimony of the sole material witness to a crime 
was the only effective means by which a state could effectively try a defendant. 
Not only does the state have the right to compel such testimony—by providing 
immunity, if necessary, and by the threat of contempt—but the state also has 
 
51 Allen v Illinois 397 US 337 (1970). 
52 Riggins v Nevada 504 US 127, 136 (1992) quoting Allen v Illinois 397 US 337, 347 
(1970). 
53 US v Weston 255 F 3d 873 (DC Cir 2001).  
54 US v Weston 255 F 3d 873, 880 (DC Cir 2001).  
55 US v Weston 255 F 3d 873, 881 (DC Cir 2001).  
56 This analogy was suggested to me by Professor Adam Candeub. 
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the right to incarcerate a material witness who will flee the jurisdiction. The 
state interest in trying a criminal defendant must be weighty if it justifies such 
substantial intrusions on the liberty of a person other than the defendant and 
who may be entirely innocent. Indeed, the state interest might even be sufficient 
to medicate the material witness involuntarily if this were the only means to 
restore competence to testify. 
Assuming that the state interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence may be 
essential, must it always be essential? For example, U.S. v. Brandon 57 held 
that the state interest would not be essential in less serious crimes. Weston took 
no position on that issue because defendant Weston was charged with multiple 
murders and the government's interest in prevention of danger is unparalleled 
in such cases of obvious threat. Weston implied, however, that the seriousness 
of the crime might be a criterion for deciding whether the state interest was 
substantial. U.S. v. Gomes58 rejected a bright line rule in favor of case-specific 
weighing, and pointed to the breadth of the harm a type of crime created and to 
the dangerousness of the defendant as the most important factors.  As we shall 
see in the next sub-section, Sell at least theoretically settled this question for 
the purpose of restoring competence to stand trial. 
Incapacitation is less weighty for less serious crimes, but some of the other 
interests, such as retribution, adjudication, and communication, would be 
equally well served by trying less serious cases. Moreover, it is not clear what 
should count as a serious crime.  In United States v. Jones,59 for example, the 
Supreme Court considered whether the Constitution permitted indefinite 
confinement of a person who was committed following a verdict of not guilty 
by reason of insanity on a charge of shoplifting a jacket. The Court was 
unwilling to limit indefinite commitment for dangerousness to those who had 
committed crimes of "violence" and was willing to characterize non-violent 
theft as sufficiently dangerous constitutionally to justify potentially life-long 
confinement to protect the public. It is reasonable to conclude that the state's 
interest in trying all defendants is as strong as the state's interest in protecting 
the public from mentally disordered, non-violent people who shoplift. 
Moreover, potentially indefinite confinement is a much greater infringement 
of liberty than transient antipsychotic treatment for the purpose of restoring 
competence. Nonetheless, if one is balancing the interests, state interests are 
diminished as the seriousness of the crime or the dangerousness of the criminal 
decreases. 
The most general, implicit objection to the state’s strong interest in 
finality is that involuntary medication to restore competence violates the basic 
 
57 US v Brandon 158 F 3d 947 (6th Cir 1998).  
58 US v Gomes 289 F 3d 71 (2d Cir 2002).  
59 US v Jones 463 US 354 (1983). 
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integrity of the American system of accusatorial, adversarial criminal justice 
because one party, the state, is permitted to intervene involuntarily in the mental 
processes of its adversary, the defendant. Although plausible, this objection 
seems unpersuasive. The essential state interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence 
and pursuing the consequences of guilt to their conclusion and the interest of all 
parties in fair process are undeniable. The defendant has no right to avoid 
adjudication if there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed or 
to avoid the consequences of guilt if the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted. 
Thus, the only question is whether involuntary medication of the defendant 
undermines the fairness of trial or the defendant's ability to help produce the 
strongest possible defense. If it does not, then the state will meet a fully 
adversarial defense. Indeed, to the extent that the defendant's mental capacities 
are improved by the medication, it is likely to improve the quality of the 
defense. Involuntary medication does not compromise the independence of 
the defense. As long as the medication is medically appropriate and is being 
used solely for the legitimate purpose of restoring competence, involuntary 
medication by the state seems neither unseemly on its face nor a violation of 
the values of the adversarial system. 
Competence to Stand Trial  
In Sell v. United States,60 the Supreme Court addressed whether and 
under what conditions the state could forcibly medicate an incompetent 
defendant for the purpose of restoring the defendant’s competence to stand 
trial.  The Court agreed, as it had previously in Harper, that citizens have a 
strong liberty interest in being free of unwanted medical interventions.  The 
Court nonetheless held that an incompetent defendant could be involuntarily 
medicated if four conditions were met: the treatment was medically 
appropriate, the governmental interest was strong because the charges were 
serious, the treatment would not cause trial prejudice, and less restrictive 
means of restoring competence were not effective.  The Court did express a 
preference for treating the defendant under an independent and less fraught 
rationale, however, such as the Harper rationale based on the defendant’s 
dangerousness.  Not all incompetent defendants satisfy such an independent 
rationale for involuntary treatment and trial courts have to apply the Sell 
criteria.  Although Sell appears to put serious restrictions on the state’s ability 
to forcibly medicate, in practice the limitations are not substantial, especially 
in federal cases.61  
 
60 Sell v United States 539 US 166 (2003).   
61 Christopher Slobogin, ‘Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants to 
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Three of Sell’s conditions are appropriate, although the issue of trial 
prejudice is best addressed at trial, as I suggest below.   I would go further, 
however, and argue that the government’s interest in trying an accused is 
sufficiently strong in the case of any felony or violent misdemeanor to justify 
forcible medication of an incompetent defendant for the purpose of restoring 
competence.  All felonies and violent misdemeanors are serious crimes 
because both have the potential to result in stigma and serious prison time, 
the interests In re Winship62 adduced when holding that the constitution 
required the state to bear the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt 
on all the elements of the crime.   A criminal prosecution is an extremely 
serious matter.  Neither the case nor the prosecution and defense should 
remain in limbo while an incompetent defendant languishes in a hospital 
untreated.  The incompetence standards and consequences are not meant to 
be used strategically by either side.  What is the point of keeping an 
incompetent defendant in a hospital to restore competence if restoration is 
made impossible by treatment refusal or by refusal to treat without informed 
consent?  The intrusion of forcible medication is not trivial, to be sure, but 
neither is it so extensive that it should block the progress of the case.  It is not 
a form of thought control or any other type of unjustifiable intervention.  
Forcible medication simply tries to restore the person’s cognitive control and 
ability to test reality.  Moreover, hospitalization is expensive and should be 
terminated as soon as possible.  Finally, no good alternative usually presents 
itself.   
Professor Christopher Slobogin63 proposed that the criteria should be 
simplified to permit forcible medication if the defendant is charged with a 
felony and if it is medically appropriate.  I have already argued that violent 
misdemeanants should also be included and I think he gives too little weight 
to the possibility of trial prejudice.  So few defendants go to trial that that this 
is not a serious practical problem, but in the relatively few cases in which it 
is a problem, it should be addressed, albeit at trial and not in the initial 
medication decision.  Thus, we may not disagree on this issue. Professor 
Slobogin also worries reasonably that the Harper rule, whereby prisoners 
who are mentally disordered and dangerous may be medicated, can be used 
to undermine the integrity of Sell’s limiting criteria, primarily because the 
meaning of dangerousness is not clear.  Consider again the Supreme Court’s Jones 
decision in which shoplifting was considered sufficient danger to justify indefinite 
post-insanity acquittal commitment.  In other words, the state may use Harper as a 
pretext for avoiding Sell to restore competence. I agree that this is a problem that 
needs clarification.  If Harper is being used for that pretextual purpose, it is an 
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abuse that must be ceased.  If there is no pretense, then the state has two 
independent justifications for forcible medication that may be used in 
appropriate cases.  Non-pretextual use of Harper forcibly to medicate that 
restores competence as a side-benefit is not an abusive practice. 
Many defendants have been and will be medicated, so we must address in 
detail how possible prejudice can be avoided.  Appropriately dosed 
medication is more likely to restore the defendant's ability to appear and 
respond appropriately, rather than to flatten his or her affect to a degree that 
conveys a potentially deleterious impression of unconcern. If altered demeanor 
does seem to risk undue prejudice either to an insanity defense or more 
generally, there are reasonable remedies. Expert witnesses can explain the 
effects of the drugs to the jury and the judge can issue cautionary instructions. 
If there is a bench trial, the dangers would be further reduced. On the other hand, 
cautionary instructions are often ineffective and expert testimony may be less 
salient than the appearance of the defendant. 
It would be optimum if the trial judge held a brief hearing just prior to trial 
to evaluate whether undue prejudice was likely to result from the competent 
defendant's medicated condition, but for resolving most potential prejudice issues 
other than the ability to communicate with counsel effectively, this determination 
will be difficult to make in a context other than the trial itself. Consequently, 
these potential problems can be best monitored at trial, when the judge will 
have the opportunity carefully to observe the defendant's particular response to 
medication. Thus, in most cases, defendants who are competent on medication 
should be tried and the effects of potential prejudice should be assessed by the trial 
judge at trial. 
If prejudice seems too great at trial, the judge may have to halt the proceedings. 
If too much prejudice has already been created or if the defendant cannot be 
restored to competence by means that do not create undue prejudice within a 
short period of time, the judge will have to declare a mistrial. The question 
then is whether this mistrial is occasioned by "manifest necessity," that is, 
conditions under which it is not unjust to re-try the defendant and double 
jeopardy does not obtain. Trial judges have great discretion in these matters. 
On the one hand, the defendant has been medicated at the prosecution's request 
and the defendant may not have moved for a mistrial. On the other hand, the 
state interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence is substantial, and the request 
for forcible medication is not done to gain a tactical advantage but to advance 
a constitutionally important value. Thus, manifest necessity should apply and 
the defendant should be tried again if he can be restored to competence without 
creating too much prejudice. Even if it is constitutionally permissible for a 
state to re-try a defendant under these circumstances, a state may impose more 
restrictive rules if it wishes. If the defendant cannot be restored to 
competence without creating prejudice, the defendant should be declared 
 
22 
 
permanently incompetent. 
 
If the defendant can prevent restoration or simply cannot be restored 
without prejudice, rendering him permanently incompetent, then the 
government must dismiss the charges, presumably with prejudice, and seek 
involuntary civil commitment.  This is an imperfect remedy because civil 
commitment terms are relatively brief and not geared to people for whom 
there is probably cause to believe a serious crime has been committed.  
Perhaps, a special form of commitment is needed.  For example, some 
jurisdictions already have special forms of lengthy commitment for certain 
classes of especially dangerous people who have been charged with a crime 
but have not been convicted, and who are non-responsible and dangerous to 
others.64 This would be a clear instance of preventive detention, but without 
necessary treatment, such commitments are simply warehousing.   
If this type of scheme were adopted, we should insist that the State prove 
that the defendant did commit the crime to differentiate the subject from the 
subject of traditional involuntary commitment.  In addition, the State should 
prove that the defendant is mentally disordered and dangerous, and the 
defendant should have full due process protections and the right to periodic 
review.65  For example, the types of protections applied to sexual predator 
commitments, including the right to full adversary counsel and proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, should be provided because so much loss of liberty is at 
stake.  Automatic review should be frequent, the review should be thorough 
and include a hearing, and some provision for permitting the person 
committed to challenge the commitment between automatic reviews should 
be available.  If the person could be forcibly treated in involuntary civil 
commitment or in some form of special commitment under a different 
rationale, then perhaps trial competence would be restored.  
Finally, consider a question that Riggins explicitly reserved and Sell did not 
address: Whether a defendant restored to competence may waive his right to 
be competent by ceasing medication, assuming that cessation is for the 
limited purpose of demonstrating his unmedicated mental state to the 
factfinder. Weston argued that the defendant claiming a mental state defense 
 
64 Cal Welf & Inst Code §§ 5008(h)(1)(B) & 5350 (West 2010), providing for 
“conservatorships” for people who are permanently incompetent to stand trial; 
conservatorships are for a year and may be renewed annually; the placement may be in a 
secure facility if necessary.  
65 Some dangerous people might still be uncommittable.  Imagine a defendant who invalidly waives 
his rights as a result of mental disorder and the State needs the evidence to obtain a conviction.  Between 
the waiver and the commitment, however, the defendant regains his mental health and is no longer 
committable.  I assume that, as a technical matter, such a person would have to be released.  I also 
assume that it would virtually never happen. 
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has no absolute right to replicate on the witness stand his mental state at the 
time of the crime. Weston used the following analogies: A defendant claiming a 
reduction to voluntary manslaughter from murder based on a theory of 
provocation and passion does not have the right to be enraged on the stand 
and a defendant claiming an intoxication-based doctrine does not have the 
right to appear in court drunk. On the other hand, most finders of fact probably 
have experience with rage and intoxication, but much less experience with 
manifest psychotic behavior. There may be particular evidentiary value in 
observing the defendant unmedicated. Therefore, unless the defendant's 
behavior would be unduly disruptive, perhaps the defendant should be 
permitted to waive the right to be competent on a temporary basis.66 This may 
appear inconsistent with the rationale for prohibiting trying incompetent 
defendants, but neither accuracy nor autonomy seems substantially 
compromised in these limited circumstances. If this were to be allowed, the 
trial judge would have to make a careful inquiry into the validity of the 
waiver, which could be temporary, with medication continuing after the 
finder of fact has observed the un-medicated state.  This would be time-
consuming and cumbersome, however, and I suspect it would seldom arise. 
 Unless the Supreme Court reverses decades of incompetence 
jurisprudence, it is not possible to try incompetent defendants even in those 
cases in which they could receive a fair trial.  To permit this, however, would 
solve many of the problems raised by Sell or by cases of seeming permanent 
incompetence, allowing final resolution of the criminal justice process.  One 
may fairly ask how we could be sure that the trial would be fair, but I suggest 
that this could be resolved at pretrial hearings.  Everything depends on how 
complicated the issues are and whether difficult strategic choices will be 
necessary in which the defendant would be likely to disagree with the 
attorney’s advice.  We could also adopt various prophylactic rules, such as 
requiring the prosecution to disclose evidence that may not pass the Brady v. 
Maryland67 threshold of actual innocence evidence, but which arguably 
favors the defense.  In any case, the issue will not arise frequently because 
most state and federal cases are resolved by plea bargains.  Nonetheless, the 
incompetence process would be rationalized in those cases in which going to 
trial seems optimal and a fair trial would be possible despite incompetence.  I 
recognize that this is a controversial suggestion and the procedural 
requirements to guarantee fairness would be complex, but, in principle, this 
is a reform that could work. 
 
66 See State v Hayes 389 A 2d 1379 (NH 1978).  
67 Brady v Maryland 373 US 83 (1963).  
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  Competence to Plead Guilty and to Waive Rights 
In Godinez, recall that the Supreme Court was asked to impose a standard 
of a so-called reasoned choice for cases involving competence to plead guilty 
and to waive the right to counsel, a test, that was different from the standard 
for incompetence to stand trial.  The argument for doing so was that pleading 
is more complicated than going to trial and therefore a different and 
presumably higher standard was required to satisfy due process.  The Court 
refused to adopt a different test, holding that the competence to stand trial 
standard was sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights as long as the waiver 
of the right to trial and other constitutional protections was actually knowing 
and voluntary.  In his concurrence in Godinez, Justice Kennedy characterized 
the requirement as “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”  After all, a 
defendant might be competent but might not actually understand what he is 
doing as a result of confusion, marginal competence, or the like.   
Requiring deeper or more detailed rational understanding risks 
paternalism, but requiring less risks an unjust outcome.  I have a preference 
for limiting paternalism as much as possible and perhaps the Court’s 
recognition that the defendant must actually waive his rights knowingly 
partially remedies the vagueness of the general test.  On the other hand, 
defining knowing or intelligent is as vulnerable to manipulation as defining 
competence itself.  In short, evaluating any competence case is a normatively 
fraught and difficult enterprise.  I have no easy answer, but simply a policy 
preference for keeping the bar relatively low to let most defendants over it.  
This will maximize liberty, but the danger is that it will also unduly risk the 
defendant’s ultimate liberty by potentiating the possibility of an irrational 
outcome. 
If the defendant is not competent to plead and to waive rights because he 
has failed the competence to stand trial standard or a state-imposed higher 
standard, the state should have a right to forcibly medicate so the defendant 
can competently make a choice—to plead guilty--that is open to and 
overwhelmingly chosen by most competent defendants.  All the same reasons 
to achieve finality that apply to competence to stand trial apply a fortiori in 
this context.  Once again, there is no need for lengthy treatment to decide if 
the defendant is restorable.   
 
 Competence to Proceed Pro Se 
This issue seems straightforward.  If the defendant is competent to stand 
trial, he is probably going to be competent to make a treatment decision.  If 
he fails an Edwards standard and is not permitted to represent himself because 
he has psychological abnormalities, then he will have every incentive to try 
to alleviate those abnormalities so that he can represent himself.  Thus, the 
defendant should be told that either he can permit medication and perhaps be 
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able to represent himself or a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.   I 
see no need for involuntary medication in this situation.  The choice he is 
offered respects his autonomy and dignity.   
In the unlikely event that the defendant’s abnormalities do render him 
incompetent to make a treatment decision even though he is competent to 
stand trial, then a dilemma arises.  Presumably his decision to represent 
himself is competently made.  The Edwards problem is not incompetence to 
make a decision; it is that the defendant’s psychological abnormalities will 
prevent him from meeting even the very low threshold for self-representation.  
If he wants to go forward pro se despite having such disabilities, that may 
indicate that his decision is not rational and perhaps he is not competent to 
stand trial either.  It is simply not clear.  In this case, I would permit forcible 
medication both to insure trial competence and to provide the strongest 
possibility of the defendant becoming sufficiently capable to overcome 
Edwards concerns. 
 
 Competence to be Sentenced 
It is inconsistent with both the offender’s dignity and autonomy and the 
dignity of the law to impose a punishment on an offender who does not 
understand what is happening.  Moreover an incompetent offender cannot 
adequately participate in the sentencing process, which may make it more 
difficult for the defense to argue for mitigation, thus reducing the fairness of 
the sentencing process. 
Unlike the defendant incompetent to stand trial who is presumed 
innocent, the defendant incompetent to be sentenced has been convicted and 
is lawfully in custody (or is perhaps out on bail, but still under criminal justice 
restraint).  The offender has a clear interest in being free of unwanted mind-
altering medication, but both the individual’s interest and the government’s 
interest in sentencing a convicted defendant are also strong.  If the offender 
is a danger to himself or others in custody—whether in a jail or a hospital—
Harper permits his involuntary medication, and he may thereby also be 
restored to competence to be sentenced.   
Suppose, however, that there is no Harper justification?  I would permit 
the state to medicate the offender as long as it was medically appropriate and 
less restrictive alternatives, such as psychosocial therapies, were unavailing.  
Defendants incompetent to be sentenced are probably not competent to refuse 
treatment for the same reasons that defendants incompetent to stand trial are 
probably not competent to refuse.  Retaining a psychotic, unsentenced convict 
in a jail is cruel, and hospitalization, which is more expensive than a prison, 
is an unjustified use of resources.  If the defendant is on bail and is not 
dangerous, treatment could be accomplished in the community on an 
outpatient basis.  There is systemic value in reaching final resolution of 
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questions a case presents and a rational convicted defendant also should want 
finality.   
If the offender simply cannot be restored or there is otherwise reason to 
avoid involuntary medication, the court could impose a conditional sentence 
and retain the person in a hospital or perhaps in prison if the latter can manage 
the person.  I assume that, as a practical matter, the sentence would be the 
maximum for the crime of conviction.  If there had been a plea bargain and 
sentence was part of the agreement, then the sentence would be for the agreed 
term.  If at any point the convict is restored to competence, either by agreeing 
to take medicine or by spontaneous recovery, the court can then impose a 
final sentence.  If the defendant is never restored to sentencing competence, 
then he would be released at the end of the conditional sentence.   
 
4.  Conclusion 
 All individuals, including defendants and prisoners in the criminal justice 
system, have a strong substantive liberty interest in avoiding unwanted 
medical interventions, such as psychotropic medication.  On the other hand, 
the state in most cases has a strong interest in adjudicating guilt or innocence 
and in completing the consequences of guilt, such as sentencing and 
punishment.  I have termed this the state interest in finality.  If forcible 
medication is used appropriately after proper procedures to restore 
competence, I believe the state interest should prevail. 
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